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Abstract
Due to significant improvements in performance in recent years, neural networks are cur-
rently used for an ever-increasing number of applications. However, neural networks have the
drawback that their decisions are not readily interpretable and traceable for a human. This
creates several problems, for instance in terms of safety and IT security for high-risk applica-
tions, where assuring these properties is crucial. One of the most striking IT security problems
aggravated by the opacity of neural networks is the possibility of so-called poisoning attacks
during the training phase, where an attacker inserts specially crafted data to manipulate the
resulting model. We propose an approach to this problem which allows provably verifying the
integrity of the training procedure by making use of standard cryptographic mechanisms.
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence · Neural Network · IT Security · Poisoning Attack · Integrity
protection · Verification
1 Introduction
The lack of transparency and interpretability in neural networks is one of the root causes of their
problems from the perspective of safety and IT security [1]. Starting from an initial state, a neural
network is trained on training data using a certain algorithm. This gives rise to a new state of the
neural network usually better fitted to solve the problem at hand. However, it is in general not
possible to derive any reliable statements from this new state on what happened during training.
Hence, it is extremely difficult to detect malicious data introduced by an attacker into the training
data set in order to manipulate the resulting model in a so-called poisoning attack [4]. Although
tests may be conducted after training using the new state of the network, due to the typically
large dimension of the input space it is highly unlikely that they will reveal the effects of specially
crafted poisoned data.
This document presents a different approach to the problem. Essentially, it allows verifying the
correctness and integrity of the training procedure for a neural network afterwards. Hash func-
tions, which are a standard cryptographic tool, are used to make sure an attacker cannot tamper
with training data and claim that other data were used for training than those that were actually
used. It is important to note that the ability to verify the training procedure is a large asset, but is
not sufficient on its own to reliably detect and counter attacks during the training phase. Indeed,
the approach only guarantees that the data provided were actually used for training the neural
network. However, it does not make any statement about the integrity of the data themselves and
the absence of manipulations, which still need to be checked. This can be done either completely
by hand, which is typically unrealistic, by an automatic procedure or by using some technical
pre-processing and manual inspection of a much smaller number of data items. Several methods
have been proposed to detect poisoning attacks [3, 12, 14]. They essentially rely on clustering
algorithms, which may take into account not only the data themselves but also the behaviour of
the neural network when processing these data. Although some of these methods work quite well
under certain circumstances, they cannot yet be used as a reliable tool for detection, especially
when facing more sophisticated poisoning attacks, e.g. [10, 13].
The document starts with some definitions concerning neural networks and briefly reviews hash
trees, the main building block of the proposed approach. It then presents a solution which allows
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verifying the correctness and integrity of training for a neural network in section 3. Two cases
are distinguished. The straightforward solution from subsection 3.1 targets the whole training
procedure, whereas a modified version, presented in subsection 3.2, allows selectively verifying
some parts of the training procedure. The raison d’être of the modification is that the standard
solution requires completely redoing the training procedure for the purpose of verification, which
may come with very high costs. The modified solution takes samples, and can thus balance the
costs by choosing the desired proportion of the training procedure to be checked. However, this
partial verification procedure is susceptible to certain attacks, which are analysed in section 4. The
solutions outlined in section 3 are extended in greater technical detail in Appendix A.
2 Definitions
In this document, we consider a neural network to be a function f : X → Y mapping data
from the input space X to the output space Y , which is defined by its general set-up (including
the type of network and the layers used) and the set of weights (wi)
n
i=1 ∈ Rn connecting its neurons.
In the training phase of the neural network, the initial weights wi ∈ R, i = 1, . . . , n, are updated
using (batches of) data from the training set D = {Di : i = 1, . . . , d}, while the general set-up is
fixed. One training step may thus be formalised as a function
T : Rn ×Db → Rn, ((wi)ni=1, (Dj1 , . . . , Djb)) 7→ (vi)ni=1,
which induces a function
T : Map(X,Y )×Db →Map(X,Y ), (f, (Dj1 , . . . , Djb)) 7→ g,
where the set-up of g is the same as that of f and the weights of g are (vi)
n
i=1 and b ∈ N is the
batch size, which is usually fixed. We use the shorthand notation D¯j = D¯j1,...,jb = (Dj1 , . . . , Djb)
for a batch of data. The function T may implicitly depend on certain values, e.g. pseudo-random
seeds, from which pseudo-random numbers are derived, or hyperparameters, cf. subsection A.1.
Furthermore, we define the map S : {1, . . . , d} → D, i 7→ Di for numbering the training data.
A hash tree [8] is a standard cryptographic data structure. In a hash tree, each leaf contains some
data (or its hash value), and each node contains the hash value of some combination (typically,
the concatenation) of the contents of its children. Using hash trees, one can efficiently verify
the integrity of large amounts of data. In order to verify the presence of a leaf a0 in a hash
tree, one needs to compute all intermediate hashes until one reaches the root hash hroot of the
tree. This requires computing a logarithmic (in the number of leaves) number of hashes if the
number of children of a node is constant (e.g. two for binary hash trees). More precisely, for
a binary hash tree, given a leaf a0, and the root hash hroot, one needs to compute the hashes
a1 := H(a0|b0), a2 := H(a1|b1), . . . , aℓ+1 := H(aℓ|bℓ) and check that aℓ+1 = hroot holds, where H
is the hash function used, the tree has depth ℓ+2, b0, . . . , bℓ is the sibling (in this example, the right
sibling) of a0, . . . , aℓ, respectively, and concatenation of a and b is denoted by a|b. Besides a0 and
hroot, the values bi, i = 0, . . . , ℓ, are thus necessary to verify that a0 is contained in the tree with
root hash hroot. Generalising the verification procedure to non-binary hash trees is straightforward.
At each level, it requires the values of all siblings of the node through which the hash chain to the
root passes.
We assume that the hash tree uses a cryptographically secure hash function H . In addition, we
make the assumption that the root hash hroot is protected using a secure digital signature algorithm
and that the signature itself is properly authenticated (e.g. via a PKI), which prevents tampering.
Recommendations for these functions may for instance be found in [2].
3 Verification procedure
This section outlines the procedures for a complete or partial verification of the training procedure.
Both solutions use hash trees. In principle, the complete verification, which needs to use all the
data and completely recalculate the hash tree, could also use other hash-based data structures, like
hash lists. However, for the sake of consistency we present the solution based on hash trees, since
the partial verification does rely on properties of hash trees. In each solution, the proving party
needs to store data specifying the training procedure, merge it into a hash tree and sign its root
hash. Upon request by the verifying party, the proving party provides some information from the
hash tree as well as the relevant information from the training procedure. This allows the verifying
party to check the training procedure was conducted as stated by the proving party.
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3.1 Complete verification
We denote our function with the initial set of weights f0. This function is now trained by repeated
application of the function T , where the second argument D¯j ∈ Db may differ between iterations,
but b is usually fixed as stated in section 2. This gives rise to a chain of transformations
f0 7→ T (f0, D¯i0,1,...,i0,b) =: f1 7→ . . . 7→ T (fk−1, D¯ik−1,1,...,ik−1,b) =: fk
with i0,1, . . . , ik−1,b ∈ {1, . . . , d}. Using the map S and the function T , knowledge of f0 and the
indices {i0,1, . . . , ik−1,b} completely determines fk.
This observation gives rise to the following idea. We use a hash tree h whose leaves contain the
following information (for more details, see subsection A.1):
1. Meta data
2. Information determining the set-up of f0
3. Information determining the function T
4. Information determining the map S
5. The indices i0,1, . . . , ik−1,b used for training f0
6. The initial weights (wi)
n
i=1 of f0
The data D themselves need not be directly included in the hash tree, but rather their hash values
are stored in category 4. (see subsection A.1 for details). We assume that these data are in any
case stored by the proving party as a backup or for future use, whether or not the information for
subsequent verification is generated during the training procedure.
Then given a neural network fk with weights (vi)
n
i=1 and the digitally signed root hash hroot of h,
the verifying party can check that fk was derived from f0 using the training procedure as specified
by h. Since the result of training is deterministic given all the information contained in the leaves
of h, it is not possible to provide false information on the data used for training or on the method
applied.
More precisely, the verifying party will check the following conditions in the stated order:
1. The digital signature of hroot is authentic and correct.
2. Hashing the information mentioned above in the right way gives hroot.
3. The training data D hashes to the values stored in 4.
4. Applying the training procedure as specified by h to f0 with initial weights (wi)
d
i=1 yields fk.
3.2 Partial verification
While the straightforward approach from subsection 3.1 can be used for the purpose of verification,
it would require a lot of computational resources. The resources for the first three steps can be
assumed to be negligible in comparison, but the fourth step requires the verifying party to repeat
all the computations necessary to reach the final state fk starting from f0. One can assume that in
many cases this is not acceptable or even infeasible for the verifying party. On the one hand, the
computing power required may be prohibitive for large neural networks, even if we assume that the
final training, which results in a neural network meeting the developer’s goals, accounts for only
a small fraction of the total computational effort expended in development. On the other hand,
the proving party may not want to disclose all data used for training the network, for instance for
protecting its intellectual property or due to data protection requirements. In such a case, one can
modify the procedure in a way which allows proving the correctness and integrity of any batch of
multiple intermediate training steps. Proving these properties for all intermediate training steps
would amount to proving them for the complete training procedure. The batches to be checked
can later be chosen by the verifying party. The proving party then needs to provide the data
necessary for checking, and the verifying party can use the hash tree h and these data to check the
respective batches. Depending on the amount of training steps to be checked, only a small subset of
the training data may need to be disclosed, thus largely protecting the proving party’s intellectual
property, since hash values from intermediate levels of h do not leak any information on these data.
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More precisely, we can use additional checkpoints fi0 , . . . , fim between the initial state f0 and the
final one fk, where i0 = 0, im = k and ij+1 > ij for all j ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}. The number m is a
parameter. The concrete value that should be assigned to it depends on the computational effort
required for the transition between two checkpoints and the space required for storing a checkpoint.
A checkpoint is defined by the tuple (ij , fij , Iij ), where ij is the number of times T was applied
to f0 to arrive at fij (in other words, the number of training steps), and the neural network fij
is defined by its weights (w
(ij)
k )
n
k=1. Iij may be empty or, if applicable, hold additional required
information. For instance, Iij may contain the state of the pseudo-random number generator at
this point, if this information cannot be straightforwardly derived from the initial pseudo-random
seeds (stored in 3., cf. subsection A.1) and the value ij itself.
Then given fij and its weights for some ij ∈ {0, . . . , k}, fij+1 and its weights, and the training data
used for the transition from fij to fij+1 , the verifying party can check the correctness and integrity
of the training steps for the transition between the checkpoints fij and fij+1 . This is done by
recomputing these steps and checking that by hashing the respective information one ultimately
arrives at the root hash hroot of the hash tree h. As before, a digital signature of hroot must also
be provided.
In this case, the hash tree h includes the following information:
1. Meta data
2. Information determining the set-up of f0
3. Information determining the function T
4. Information determining the map S
5. For each ij with j ∈ {0, . . . ,m}:
(a) The value ij itself, i.e. the number of training steps since the start of training to arrive
at fij
(b) The weights of fij
(c) The (ij+1 − ij)b indices of data used in the training steps between fij and fij+1 (which
we define as the empty set for j = m)
(d) If applicable, additional information from Iij
The verifying party will check the following conditions in the stated order:
1. The digital signature of hroot is authentic and correct.
2. The information from 1.–4. is contained in the hash tree h.
3. For each transition from fij to fij+1 to be verified:
(a) The respective information from 5. is contained in the hash tree h.
(b) The training data D used in the training steps between fij and fij+1 according to 5.(c)
hashes to the values stored in 4.
(c) Using the training set items as specified by the respective indices and applying the
training procedure as specified in 1.–4. to fij yields fij+1 .
Whenever the presence of information in the hash tree h is checked, this is done using the properties
of h as discussed in section 2. The proving party needs to furnish all information from intermediate
levels of the hash tree which is necessary for these calculations.
When choosing the number v of transitions between checkpoints to be verified, there is a trade-off
between efficiency and the integrity guarantees attained. On the one hand, decreasing this number
reduces the computing time required to repeat the calculations. On the other hand, when checking
less transitions, one only checks the correctness of a smaller portion of the training procedure, and
the probability of discovering integrity violations diminishes. In any case, the concrete transitions
to be checked must not be known beforehand, since using a pre-defined set of transitions would
allow an adversary to hide malicious changes without any risk of being exposed.
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4 Security analysis
In the case of partial verification, an attacker can provide a certain amount of false data and has
some chance that he will not be exposed. Since only a certain amount of checkpoint transitions are
verified, if the attacker provides false data for a small number of transitions, his risk of exposure
is quite low. Assume there are m checkpoint transitions in total, v of them are verified (using
random sampling) and the attacker manipulates the data for a transitions, then the probability p
that this will go unnoticed is about
p =
v−1∏
i=0
(
1− a
m− i
)
≈
(
1− a
m
)v
=
(
1− a
m
)m· v
m ≈ exp
(
−a · v
m
)
.
For instance, if the verifying party chooses to check v =
√
m transitions and the attacker has
manipulated data for a = v10 transitions, we get p ≈ exp(−0.1) ≈ 0.9048. We note that the pre-
cision of the first approximation is quite good, unless v gets close to m (i.e. a significant part of
the transitions are checked); concerning the second approximation, convergence to the exponential
function is quite fast. For example, taking m = 2500 and again using v =
√
m and a = v10 , the
exact formula for p evaluates to p ≈ 0.9038.
The attacker may achieve even higher values for p, but whether this is still feasible (since a ≥ 1
necessarily needs to hold) depends on the values of m and v, which he cannot directly influence.
In addition, a very small value for a means the attacker can only use a small amount of poisoned
samples for training, which might severely degrade the performance of a poisoning attack, render-
ing it ineffective.
However, in case an attacker tampers with the verification data, there is no need for him to only
provide false information on which data were used for training during a particular transition (cate-
gory 5.(c) in subsection 3.2). He might as well lie about the number of training steps taken during
this transition (category 5.(a)). In this way, a much more powerful attack may become feasible,
since the attacker can generate the verification data for a particular transition and have it contain
an average, inconspicuous number of training steps, whereas in fact that transition included many
more steps and introduced a massive amount of poisoned data. Essentially, it is not possible to
guarantee the correctness of the number of steps asserted for a transition without performing the
verification procedure for this transition.
One approach to mitigate this problem would be to use a more sophisticated algorithm for sampling
the transitions to be checked. For instance, one might choose those transitions with a higher
probability whose initial and final weights and/or performance differ much more than is the case
on average. Intuitively, this should increase the probability of finding transitions using an unusually
large number of training steps. However, the attacker might additionally tamper with the initial or
final weights of transitions adjacent to the transition he originally targeted in order to level out the
changes and defeat the verifier’s heuristic. For instance, when targeting transition i and restricting
manipulations to a transitions as above, he might also change the information from category 5.(b)
for transitions i+ 1, . . . , i+ a− 1. If this successfully levels out any information the verifier might
use, the probability of the attack going unnoticed is again p as computed above.
5 Conclusion and outlook
The integrity of the training procedure of neural networks can be protected using well-known
cryptographic mechanisms, which also allow another party to verify the integrity afterwards. This
document has outlined a proposal on how to adapt the cryptographic mechanisms to the setting
in question. While integrity can only be guaranteed with certainty by completely repeating the
training procedure, the partial verification procedure as specified above can give a verifier a certain
amount of confidence about the integrity and expose an attacker manipulating data to the risk
of being detected. There is a trade-off between the level of confidence, based upon the proba-
bility of manipulations going unnoticed, and the computational effort and storage space required
for verification (see subsection A.3), which can be tuned using several parameters (the number of
checkpoints to be stored and of transitions to be verified).
The more sophisticated attack scenarios on the partial verification procedure presented in section 4,
which are based on including false meta data about the number of training steps between two
checkpoints, and possible mitigations could be further explored both analytically and empirically
to derive more accurate estimates on the probability of successful attacks.
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It is important to note that protecting and verifying the integrity of the training procedure does
not in itself prevent poisoning attacks, which introduce specially crafted malicious training data,
but is just one building block for solving this problem. Rather, the absence of malicious training
data must additionally be confirmed using methods for poisoning detection.
This document focused on protecting the integrity of the training procedure as the key stage of the
life cycle of neural networks, but the underlying ideas lend themselves to an easy generalisation
to other stages of this life cycle. For instance, protecting the integrity of transmitted sensor data,
their curation and their pre-processing all the way to the training data set can effectively prevent
the addition of poisoned samples, if properly implemented.
The security of the proposed solution is based on the security of the cryptographic mechanisms
used. These should hence be chosen and implemented with care. In particular, digital signatures
must be used for sealing the hash tree against tampering and they must be properly authenticated.
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A Appendix: Technical details
A.1 List of data included in hash tree
This section makes a proposal on which data to include in the different categories as sketched
in subsection 3.1 and subsection 3.2. The objective is to include all data which are necessary for
deterministically reproducing the training procedure or parts thereof. If applicable, the lists may
be extended or redundant information may be removed in concrete implementations. We advocate
establishing consensus on a standardised list of data and on the structure of the hash tree (see
subsection A.2) in order to make the approach interoperable between different parties with no or
minimal modifications.
Meta data
The meta data contain all information necessary for parsing and interpreting the other pieces of
information. This includes the concrete values of the constants k (the total number of training
steps) and m (describing the number of checkpoints) as well as the number of values included in
the different categories of data and the way they are structured.
Information determining the set-up of f0
This category includes the following data:
1. General architecture of the neural network
2. Number of layers
3. Number of neurons in each layer
4. Ordering of weights (i.e. meta data on the order in which the weights are stored in the hash
tree)
Information determining the function T
This category includes the following data (readers unfamiliar with the general terminology of neural
networks may for instance refer to [5]):
1. Loss function
2. Optimisation method
3. Pseudo-random seeds
4. Regularisation terms
5. Values of hyperparameters
Information determining the map S
This category includes the following data:
1. Size d of training data set
2. (i,H(Di))
d
i=1, tuples of the number i and the hash value of training set item Di
The indices used for training f0 or between checkpoints fij and fij+1
This is straightforward.
Weights
This category of data contains the weights of the initial function f0 and the intermediate check-
points fij , respectively. It includes:
1. Number n of weights
2. The weights wk or w
ij
k , k = 0, . . . , n, respectively
3. If applicable, weight-dependent information used in the optimisation method (e.g. momentum
method [9], Adam [7])
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hroot
h1
· · ·
h2 h3 h4 h5 h6
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
...
...
...
...
Figure 1: Structure of the hash tree for complete verification (schematic representation). The
sub-trees under h2, h3, h5 and h6 are not shown for reasons of space.
A.2 Structuring the hash tree
The concrete structure of the hash tree h affects the storage space and the amount of computations
which are required for performing a verification. Binary hash trees would be the straightforward
and standard solution. They offer the great advantage that for verifying the presence of a leaf
they require at most one additional value at each level (if applicable, the sibling of the respective
node) in order to compute and check the hash chain to the root hash. However, in our application
the leaves whose presence is checked are not independent from each other and we often need to
check whole batches of leaves at the same time anyway. Furthermore, binary trees require more
intermediate levels than trees with more siblings. In particular, more intermediate values need to
be stored. For instance, using the formulae for the geometric series it is easy to see that when
using a hash tree where every node has four children instead of two, one can reduce the amount of
intermediate nodes by up to a factor of three. Including the leaves, this leads to saving about one
third of the storage space.
Due to this observation, we propose the following structure for the hash tree, which as a side effect
tries to give some logical meaning to (some) intermediate nodes and thus make the scheme more
easily comprehensible.
For complete verification, all the leaves of the tree need to be checked. In principle, one could
imagine a tree with just one level, with the root hash being the hash of the concatenation of all
the leaves. However, this would both completely obfuscate the semantic structure of the data to
be stored and make debugging overly difficult. Instead, we propose to hash together data from the
same category (i.e. meta data, information on f0, . . . ) and finally compute the root hash from the
concatenation of the category-wise root hashes (which we denote hj for category j). Data from
the same category may be hashed together using concatenation of all items (which we propose
for categories 1.–3., which contain relatively few data) or by using hash sub-trees, whether binary
or otherwise (which we suggest for the other categories). A sketch of the hash tree structure is
depicted in Figure 1.
For partial verification, only a portion of the leaves needs to be checked. While the general infor-
mation from categories 1.–4. is required as in the case of complete verification, only some sample
of the information for the transition between two checkpoints is verified. This leads us to suggest
the following layout for the hash tree: The root hash of the tree is again computed from the con-
catenation of category-wise root hashes (denoted hj for category j again). Categories 1.–4. should
be treated in the same way as for complete verification.
For category 5., for each ij with j ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, the corresponding data should be hashed together.
The top hashes h5,ij for the different values of ij should be combined using a binary hash tree
whose root hash is the root hash of category 5, h5. A binary tree is suggested, since only some
values for ij are checked and they are not known beforehand. Using a binary tree makes sure that
the amount of intermediate information required to recompute h5 is as small as possible. For each
ij, we compute the top hash h5,ij as h5,ij = H(ij |h5,ij ,b|h5,ij ,c|h5,ij ,d), where ij is the value from
subcategory 5.(a), and h5,ij ,b, h5,ij ,c and h5,ij ,d are the top hashes of appropriate hash trees com-
bining the data from subcategories (b), (c) and (d), respectively. Since the data from 5.(b), 5.(c)
and 5.(d) for any selected ij need to be checked at the same time, we suggest to use non-binary
hash trees in order to save space. The exact number of children at each level of the hash tree can
be chosen based on the amount of data to be stored and practical considerations regarding the
implementation. Figure 2 sketches the proposed hash tree for partial verification.
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hroot
h1
· · ·
h2 h3 h4 h5
h5,i0
i0
h5,i0,b
h5,i0,c h5,i0,d
· · ·
h5,i1
i1
h5,i1,b
h5,i1,c
h5,i1,d
h5,im−1 h5,im
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
} binary hash tree {
Figure 2: Structure of the hash tree for partial verification (schematic representation)
A.3 Storage requirements
In this section, we estimate the storage overhead induced by the proposed approach. We assume
that the training data themselves are in any case stored by the proving party as a backup or for
future use and hence do not consider them in the analysis that follows.
Large neural networks can have up to about 227 parameters [6, 11], and storing these parameters can
require storage space in the hundreds of megabyte, which we estimate by 29 MB when using 32 bits
of precision. Hence, storing only the weights for m checkpoints would require 29m MB = m2 GB of
storage space. The additional storage space for categories 1.–4. and 5.(a), 5.(c) and 5.(d) should
be negligible in comparison (note that in category 4., only the hash values of the data items Di
are stored, not the data themselves, which might have non-negligible size).
For a fixed checkpoint ij , if the hash tree with root hash h5,ij ,b has, for instance, 16 children at
each level, the penultimate level includes 223 nodes, each of size 25 B when using SHA-256 as a
hash function. Therefore, 228 B = 28 MB of storage space are required to store the penultimate
level of the hash tree. The preceding layer would hence require 24 MB, and so forth. In this way,
the overall storage requirement for these hash trees when using 16 children per level is less than
the one required for storing the parameters themselves. The total storage requirement for storing
the data corresponding to m checkpoints is thus bounded by m GB.
If weight-dependent information for specific optimisation methods needs to be included (e.g. for
the momentum method [9] or Adam [7]), this information needs to be stored at every checkpoint.
Since it requires essentially the same amount of storage as the weights themselves, the total storage
requirement doubles in this case, giving an upper bound of 2m GB.
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